What would a quantum computer threaten in Bitcoin?

Originally reported on November 12, 2026, at 09:58 China Standard Time. This article is based on a report jointly published by the Bitcoin Security Consortium and Presidio Bitcoin, translated by TechFlow.

The short answer: A sufficiently capable quantum computer could threaten Bitcoin’s transaction signatures. The report says no cryptographically relevant quantum computer has yet been demonstrated. The concern is how to prepare for one without treating research estimates as working attacks.

Two ways a public key could be exposed

Bitcoin signatures let someone authorize a spend without revealing their private key. The report describes two potential attacks using a quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm:

  • At rest: Some coins already have exposed public keys, notably those held at reused addresses and early pay-to-public-key (P2PK) outputs. An attacker with sufficient capability could try to derive a private key from one of those public keys. Citing Project Eleven, the report estimates that about 7.1 million BTC, or 35% of total supply, would be at risk if a capable machine existed today. Roughly three-quarters of that estimate is attributed to reused addresses, particularly at large exchanges. The report also describes about 1.8 million BTC in dormant P2PK outputs as probably lost.
  • In flight: For many other outputs, the public key is hidden until a transaction spends them. Broadcasting that transaction creates a window before it is included in a block. The report uses roughly 10 minutes as an illustration, while noting that the actual window is the time from submission to inclusion. It cites a Google estimate of as little as nine minutes to derive one private key on a hypothetical, ready high-clock-speed quantum device. That is an estimate, not a demonstrated theft.

The report also gives a narrower P2PK count in its discussion of possible remedies: about 1.7 million BTC across 20,000 addresses, including an estimated 1.1 million BTC attributed to Satoshi Nakamoto. It does not reconcile that figure with its earlier estimate of 1.8 million BTC.

Why research progress is not a working attack

The report points to Google’s Willow chip and 2026 work on more efficient Shor-algorithm circuits as reasons to take preparation seriously. But circuit designs and error-correction demonstrations are not machines capable of breaking Bitcoin keys. According to the report, the strongest publicly demonstrated system had 48 error-corrected logical qubits, against an estimate of at least about 1,200 needed to attack Bitcoin’s elliptic-curve cryptography. Scaling up while keeping errors low remains the obstacle.

A successful signature attack would threaten control of affected coins; it would not, by itself, rewrite Bitcoin’s issuance schedule or supply cap. Nor would one calculation expose every vulnerable private key at once: each target would require its own attempt.

What preparation involves

The most immediate measure described in the report is moving coins away from reused addresses and avoiding further reuse. That can reduce exposure without changing Bitcoin’s rules, but it depends on holders and custodians taking action. It does not solve the risk posed by public keys revealed during a spend.

For that longer-term problem, the report discusses Blockstream’s proposed SHA-256-based SHRINCS signature scheme. It says Blockstream tested it on Liquid in March 2026 and published a Bitcoin improvement proposal with contributors in August. Its formal security proof was still in progress, and deploying it across Bitcoin would require a soft fork. The report’s throughput comparison—up to three transactions per second for SHRINCS versus 0.36 for NIST’s SPHINCS+—describes proposed schemes, not an enacted Bitcoin upgrade.

Dormant P2PK coins present a harder choice. The report lists three approaches under discussion: leave old spending valid, limit its rate, or disable old spending while offering a proposed recovery route using a zero-knowledge proof. None is presented as an adopted rule. The trade-off is between protecting exposed coins and changing the conditions under which their existing holders could spend them.

Source: techflowpost.com (originally published 2026-11-12 09:58 UTC+8)